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legislation. 98
 The enactment of such an amendment is, therefore,
recommended. *
BARRY LARMAN
Civil Procedure—Class Actions—Notice Obligations of Representa-
tive Plaintiff—Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.'—In 1966, Morton
Eisen filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York on behalf of himself and all other persons who
had purchased or sold odd-lots 2
 on the New York Stock Exchange
from May 1, 1962 through June 30, 1966. 3 In the complaint, two of
the Exchange's major odd-lot brokerage firms, Carlisle & Jacquelin
and DeCoppet & Doremus, were charged with monopolizing odd-lot
trading and charging excessive fees. 4
 A third defendant, the New
York Stock Exchange, was charged with failing to regulate the fees
charged by the two firms. 5 Eisen's' individual claim included treble
damages for the amount of the overcharge and amounted to a total
of seventy dollars. 6
 The claim for the class as a whole, which
95
 The bills cited in note 97 supra would appear to be unnecessarily broad. The proposed
amendments provide that an agency is merely permitted to make disclosure of names and
addresses after the necessary certification has been made; it is not required to do so. See bills
cited in note 97 supra. Such discretion could possibly result in the refusal of all requests for
names and addresses regardless of the purpose for which they were sought—for if there is any
lesson to be learned from the history of the FOIA, it is that where disclosure is discretionary,
there is likely to be no disclosure at all. See text at notes 16-25 supra. This problem cannot be
solved merely by making disclosure mandatory upon certification. Such a provision would
require disclosure in all instances, without regard to the resulting invasion of privacy suffered
by the individuals concerned. Some type of balancing, therefore, would appear to be required
in determining whether non-commercial requests for names and addresses should be granted.
It is also suggested that the provision which requires a certification that the list "will not
be used for purposes of commercial or. oilier solicitation . . ." is unduly restrictive. H.R.
6840, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., ¶ (2)(A)(i) (1973) (emphasis added). Courts and agencies might
construe such a provision as empowering an agency to refuse disclosure in instances where the
requesting party seeks merely to interview or otherwise question persons whose names appear
on the disclosed list. Such a restriction would make the execution of a study such as that
which was at issue in Getman totally dependent upon the whim of agency bureaucrats. See
text at notes 57.64 supra. This is the very situation which the FOIA was intented to prevent.
* As this article was going to press, Congress passed certain amendments to the FOIA
over President Ford's veto. This legislation is not relevant to the issues presented in Wine
Hobby.
417 U.S. 156 (1974).
2
 "Odd-lots" are shares traded in lots of less then a hundred. Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
3
 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. at 160.
4
 The defendant firms were alleged to have violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970). 417 U.S. at 160.
5
 The Exchange was alleged to have violated §§ 6 and 19 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 785 (1970). 94 U.S. at 160.
6
 417 U.S. at 161.
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included approximately six million shareholders, was estimated to
be from twenty-two million to sixty million dollars.'
Shortly after the suit was filed, the defendants moved, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1), 8 for dismissal of the
action for failure to meet the requirements for maintenance of a class
action. 9 The issues raised by this motion proved to be so complex
that in six federal court decisions, rendered during the following
eight years, the courts were unable to move beyond this question to
the merits of Eisen's complaint)° The Supreme Court, however,
ultimately resolved the issue of maintainability by ordering dismissal
of the class action, since Eisen claimed he could not afford to
comply with the Court's holding)' In this case of first impression,
interpreting the notice provision of Rule 23(c)(2), the Court held that
the representative plaintiff must provide individual notice to all
identifiable class members.° The effect of this holding will be to
decrease the ability of the small claimant to seek redress.°
Initially, the district court construed the notice provision of
Rule 23(c)(2) 14 as requiring not only publication, but also individual
notice to each identifiable class member." Eisen had argued that he
could not afford to provide individual notice to the approximately
two million identifiable class members. Despite this argument, the
court decided that since Eisen could not provide individual notice,
he had not met the prerequisite of establishing that he could "fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class." Consequently, the
class action was dismissed as not maintainable. 16
7
 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
8
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) provides in part: "As soon as practicable after the commence-
ment of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to
be so maintained.
° The prerequisites to a class action are prescribed in Fed. R. Civ, P. 23(a) and (b),
which provide in pertinent part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (I) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: . . , (3) the court
finds that the questions of law or fact common to .the members of the class predomi-
nate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy.
1 ° 417 U.S. at 159, 161.
" Id. at 179.
" Id. at 177.
13
 For a definition of "small claimant," see text at note 40 infra.
Fed. R. Civ, P. 23(c)(2) states "ETThe court shall direct to the members of the class the
best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members
who can be identified through reasonable effort."
" 41 F.R.D. at 151-52.
16
 Id. al 150 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)), 152.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed, and instructed the district court to give the language of
Rule 23 a more liberal interpretation." On remand, the district
court reexamined the notice provision and decided that the proper
notice could be given by a less costly procedure, consisting of notice
by publication together with individual notice to only 7,000 of the
identifiable class members." The court also decided that the defend-
ants must bear part of the cost of notice if a preliminary hearing on
the merits indicated that the plaintiff would probably prevail at
trial. Since it appeared that Eisen could meet these less stringent
notice requirements, the class action was held to be maintainable."
Following discovery procedures, a preliminary hearing on the merits
resulted in a finding that the plaintiff class was "more than likely to
prevail" at trial.'" Accordingly, the defendants were ordered to pay
90% of the notice costs. 21
In its final ruling on the Eisen case, the court of appeals again
reversed, stating that the district court had construed Rule 23 too
liberally. 22
 According to the court of appeals, the notice provision
should have been construed as requiring individual notice to each
identifiable member and the preliminary hearing on the merits
should not have been used to distribute costs, since it was unau-
thorized by Rule 23 and likely to be extremely prejudicial to the
losing party. 23
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 24
 in order to resolve
these issues over the proper construction of Federal Rule 23. 25 The
Court HELD: (1) Rule 23(c)(2) requires individual notice to be sent
to each class member who can be identified through reasonable
effort; 26 and (2) the representative plaintiff must initially bear the
total cost of notice. 27
 The decision of the court of appeals was
vacated and the case remanded with instructions to dismiss the class
action as defined. 28
17 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 563 (2c1 Cir. 1968). In its prior order in
the Eisen case, the court of appeals ruled that the district court's order dismissing the suit as a
class action was appealable as an order within the meaning of the word "final" in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1970). Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1966).
13 52 F.R.D. at 267-68. This procedure reduced the notice cost from $315,000 to
$21,720. 417 U.S. at 167 & n.7.
19 52 F.R.D. at 270-72.
2D
 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 54 F.R.D. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
21 Id .
22 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1015 (2d Or. 1973).
23 Id. at 1015-16.
24 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
23 417 U.S. at 159.
26
 Id, at 177. The Court's opinion was written by Justice Powell.
27
 Id. The Court further ruled that the district court's resolution of the notice problem
constituted a "final" and thus appealable decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1970) and thereby upheld the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. 417 U.S. at 172. See note 17
supra.
" Id. at 179.
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Noting the provision in Rule 23(c)(2), that a judgment in a class
suit is binding on each class member who does not request exclu-
sion, the Court premised its holding that individual notice must be
sent to each identifiable member on what it considered to be the
"unmistakable" import of Rule 23. 29 According to the Court, the
"expr.ess language and intent" of Rule 23(c)(2) 3 ° left "no doubt" that
such notice was an "unambiguous" requirement of the Rule and not
a discretionary consideration. 31 Furthermore, the Court concluded
that the preliminary hearing conflicted with the Rule's requirement
that a class action be determined to be maintainable before the
merits are considered. Finally, the'Court stated that a preliminary
hearing on the merits was likely to cause substantial prejudice to the
defendant. 32 Having found no authority in Rule 23 for a preliminary
distribution of costs between the parties, the Court declared that the
usual rule that the plaintiff must initially bear the notice expenses
should be followed. 33
In a separate opinion 34 Justice Douglas considered the sugges-
tion by Second Circuit Judge Oakes 35 that Eisen's class be divided
into subclasses with a suit by one subclass being treated as a test
case. 36 Justice Douglas noted, however, that this proposal raised
two issues that needed to be resolved: whether the statute of limita-
tions could be tolled for all class members pending the subclass suit
and whether the judgment of the subclass suit could be binding on
all class members. 37
It will be submitted that the Court's holdings in Eisen, as
Justice Douglas appeared to recognize, will seriously undermine a
principal objective of Rule 23(b)(3) by impeding the small claimant's
efforts to obtain relief. One of the main purposes of Rule 23(b)(3), as
amended in 1966, 38 was to provide a means—the class action—by
29 Id. at 173.
" For the language of Fed. R. Civ, P. 23(c)(2), see note 14 supra.
31 417 U.S. at 175-76.
32
 Id. at 177-78.
33 Id. at 178.
34 Justice Douglas' opinion which dissented in part (with Justices Brennan and Marshall
concurring), agreed with the majority's holdings but went on to explore issues with which the
majority opinion had not dealt but which were felt to be important to the disposition of the
case on remand. Id. (dissenting opinion).
35 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1021 (2d Cir. 1973) (dissenting from
denial of rehearing en bane).
36
 417 U.S. at 180 (dissenting opinion), The creation of subclasses is authorized by Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B).
37 417 U.S. at 181-82 (dissenting opinion).
35
 For a discussion of problems which arose under Rule 23 as originally enacted, see
Advisory Committee's Note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, - 98-99 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Adv, Comm. Note].
Amended Rule 23 provides that a class action may be maintained under three sets of
circumstances: Rule 23(b)(1) permits class actions where separate actions would create a risk
of inconsistent adjudications to the party opposing the class or to the class members; Rule
23(b)(2) permits them where injunctive or declaratory relief on behalf of the class is appropri-
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which the small claimant could seek redress. 39 A.small claimant is a
person who has sustained actual injury but whose claim is too
insignificant to justify the expense of individual litigation. 40 Rule
23(c)(2) contains the provision for notice to class members which will
govern Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. Thus, the Eisen Court's decision
interpreting Rule 23(c)(2) must be analyzed in light of the objective of
affording relief to small claimants, the fulfillment of .which may be
prevented if the small claimant must meet burdensome notice re-
quirements in his pursuit of relief.
In holding that the representative plaintiff must send individual
notice to each identifiable class member, the Court appeared to
place great emphasis on the language in Rule 23(c)(2), which states:
"[T]he court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to
all members who can be identified through reasonable effort."'" It
has been argued, however, that an interpretation of Rule 23(c)(2) as
requiring individual notice to all identifiable class members reduces
the "best notice practicable" and "reasonable effort" provisions of
that Rule to "mere verbiage." 42 Courts and commentators have
construed Rule 23(c)(2) as providing that the form of notice required
in each case should be left to the district court's discretion and that
the suit should not be dismissed summarily whenever the represen-
tative plaintiff cannot afford to give individual notice to all
identifiable class members.'"
In support of its decision" the Court cited the statement in the
Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, 45
that "under subdivision (c) (2), notice . . is not merely
discretionary."46 This statement, however, could be interpreted as
indicating merely that some form of notice is required rather than
ate; and Rule 23(b)(3) permits class actions where common questions of law or fact would
warrant them. 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice I I 23.02-1, at 23-124 (2d ed. 1974).
39 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968); Katz v. Carte Blanche
Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539, 545 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 484-85
(E.D.N.V. 1968); Kaplan, A Prefatory Note to "The Class Action—A Symposium," 10 B.C.
Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 497 (1969); Ford, Federal Rule 231 A Device for Aiding the Small
Claimant, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 501, 504 (1969); Ward & Elliott, The Contents and
Mechanics of Rule 23 Notice, 10 B.C. Ind. & COM. L. Rev. 557 (1969).
40 Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits
—The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1971). Plaintiff Eisen
was a small claimant since, as the Court noted, Inio competent attorney would undertake his
complex antitrust action to recover so inconsequential an amount" as his claim of seventy
dollars. 417 U.S. at 161.
41 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
" Ward & Elliott, supra note 39, at 559.
43 E.g., Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Booth v. General
Dynamics Corp., 264 F. Supp. 465, 472 (N. D. III. 1967); Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in
Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313, 319-20 (1973); Ford, supra note 39, at 512.
44 417 U.S. at 173.
45 39 F.R.D. 69, 98 et seq. (1966).
" Id. at 106.
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that a particular form of notice, individual notice to each
identifiable member, is necessary. The interpretation that notice, in
some form, is all that is required would seem to be reinforced by
analysis of the Committee's statement in the context in which it was
made. The Committee was comparing the notice provision in Rule
23(c)(2), which governs the Rule 23(b)(3) class action utilized prior
to Eisen by many small claimants, with the notice provision in Rule
23(d)(2), 47 which leaves to the court's discretion the question of
whether any notice in class actions other than those brought under
Rule 23(b)(3) should be required. 48
The Advisory Committee further stated that the Rule 23(c)(2)
notice provision was designed to fulfill the requirements of due
process. 49 Noting this statement by the Advisory Committee, the
Court in Eisen cited Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co. 5° and Schroeder v. City of New Yorks' as authority for the
principle , that due process requires individual notice to each
identifiable class member in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. 52 The
aforementioned cases did hold that individual notice to each
identifiable party in the action was required by due processs 3 but
neither of the cases involved a Rule 23 class action. 54 Furthermore,
in past interpretations of Mullane, the Supreme Court" and other
courts56 have stated that due process requires that the appropriate
47 Fed, R, Civ. P. 23(d) provides in pertinent part: "In the conduct of actions to which
this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: . . (2) requiring . . . that notice be
given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members .. . ."
49
 Adv. Comm. Note, supra note 38, at 106-07. See notes 38, 47 supra.
49 39 F.R.D. at 107.
59 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
51 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
52 417 U.S. at 174-75.
55 In Mullane, the Court ruled that notice by publication to beneficiaries of a common
trust fund as part of a judicial settlement of accounts did not satisfy due process requirements
where the names and addresses of the beneficiaries were known. 339 U.S. at 318-20. In
Schroeder it was held "that the newspaper publications and posted notices in the cir-
cumstances of this case, did not measure up to the quality of notice which the Due Process
Clause . . . requires." 371 U.S. at 211.
14 The issue raised in Mullane was the constitutional sufficiency of notice by the trustee
of a common trust fund to beneficiaries of the judicial settlement of accounts. 339 U.S. at 307.
The attorneys who served as guardians ad litem for the beneficiaries in Mullane acted without
the advice or assistance of any client. Their fees were court-established and not predicated on
success. Comment, Constitutional and Statutory Requirements of Notice Under Rule 23(c)(2),
10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 571, 572 (1969). Furthermore, the trust company had mailed
notice to each known beneficiary in the past and the Court recognized in its opinion that
postal notification would not seriously burden the trust company. 339 U.S. at 310, 319.
Schroeder involved the condemnation of real property owned by a single individual. 371
U.S. at 208-09.
55 See Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), where the Court stated: "In
the Mullane case . . . the Court thoroughly canvassed . the practical considerations which
make it impossible to draw a standard set of specifications as to what is constitutionally
adequate notice, to be mechanically applied in every situation." Id. at 212.
56 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 500 (E.D.N,Y. 1968); Comment, supra note 54,
at 575.
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form of notice be determined on a case-by-case basis, not by a rule
"to be mechanically applied in every situation."57 Moreover, the
Court in Schroeder expressly limited its holding to the facts of that
case. 58
These various interpretations of the language of Rule 23, the
Advisory Committee's Note, and the Mullane and Schroeder cases
suggest that the Court's construction of Rule 23(c)(2)59 is not the
only reasonable interpretation. Another reasonable interpretation of
this provision is that the appropriate form of notice in each case
should be left to the district court's discretion. 6° This interpretation
of subdivision Rule 23(c)(2) may be more desirable than the Court's
construction when considered in terms of the possible impact upon
small claimant suits. If the form of notice were a discretionary
matter, the small claimant would not be precluded from utilizing the
class action device as a means by which to seek redress whenever
the class contained a large number of identifiable members. Fur-
thermore, construing Rule 23(c)(2) as providing that the form of notice
be discretionary would not result in any unfairness to the defend-
ants, since under either interpretation of Rule 23(c)(2), all class
members who do not expressly request exclusion would be bound by
the judgment."
Finally, it does not appear that class members in small claimant
class suits would be more adversely affected by the "discretionary"
interpretation of Rule 23(c)(2) than by the Court's nondiscretionary
interpretatiop. If a class suit on behalf of small claimants is fore-
closed because the representative plaintiff cannot afford to provide
individual notice to each identifiable member, the class member
would probably have no other avenue of recourse due to the
financial infeasibility of commencing an individual suit. On the
other hand, while his chances of receiving actual notice are de-
creased if individual notice of a class action's pendency is not
required, the likelihood of obtaining redress is enhanced by the mere
fact that the merits of the suit will be heard. Furthermore, class
members are at least partially protected, regardless of whether they
receive notice, by the requirement that the representative plaintiff
show that he is a capable representative of, and has an identity of
interest with, the class. 62
52 Schroeder v. City of New York, 3,71 U.S. at 212. See note 55 supra.
58
 371 U.S. at 211. See note 53 supra.
59
 For the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(0(2), see note 14 supra.
6° See text at notes 42-43 supra and authorities cited in notes 42-43 supra.
81
 Fed. R. Civ, P. 23(c)(2)(B); Adv. Comm, Note, supra note 38, at 105.
62 See note 9 supra. As one commentator has noted, class actions constitute an exception
to two important principles of procedural law:
[E]ach person is free to determine whether, when, and how to enforce his substan-
tive rights; [and] each person is entitled to his day in court before his rights are
affected by a judgment. Powerful as they are, the abstract objections to being bound
by the actions of others yielded long ago ... to the practicalities of life and the law,
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The second holding in Eisen that the representative plaintiff
must bear the cost of notice appears to be a just resolution of the
problem. A preliminary hearing on the merits was held in the
district court to allocate the costs of notice on the basis of the
plaintiff's likelihood of success. The Supreme Court objected to the
preliminary hearing because: (1) it was unauthorized by Rule 23; (2)
it conflicted with Rule 23(c)(1); and (3) it could result in substantial
prejudice to the defendant. Accordingly, the Court applied the usual
rule that the plaintiff should bear the cost of notice. 63 The Eisen
opinion, however, would be more persuasive if the Court had more
fully explored this issue and further developed the reasons for its
holding.
As the Court noted, a preliminary hearing on the merits to
allocate initially the notice costs between the parties is not au-
thorized by Rule 23. 64 This rationale, however, is not fully persua-
sive since Rule 23 does not address itself to the issue of if or how
notice costs should be allocated. Secondly, it appears that the Court
may have erred in stating that the preliminary hearing contravened
Rule 23(c)(1)65 by permitting the merits to be considered before the
maintainability of the class action was established. 66 The district
court in Eisen found that the suit met the prerequisites for a class
action,67 and thus held it to be maintainable prior to holding the
preliminary hearing on the merits. 68
In addition, the Court reasoned that the preliminary hearing
could be prejudicial to the defendant "since of necessity it is not
accompanied by the traditional rules and procedures applicable to
civil trials."69 The Court, though, did not proceed to explain why
"of necessity" such a hearing could not be accompanied by rules
protecting the defendant's rights." Moreover, the Court did not
elaborate on its comment that the tentative findings of the hearing
could place an "unfair burden" on the defendant.7'
Finally, the Court did not sufficiently develop the reasoning
to the need to afford an effective remedy for the protection of rights and to the
reduction of repetitive litigation.
Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 Buff. L. Rev. 433,
433-34 (1960),
63 417 U.S. at 177-78.
" Id, at 177.
65 For the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1), see note 8 supra.
66 417 U.S. at 177-78.
67 See note 9 supra.
68 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 272 (S,D.N.Y. 1971).
69 417 U.S. at 178.
70 It has been suggested that the same rules and procedures that accompany the granting
of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions on the basis of preliminary
hearings on the merits could be used for protecting the defendant when such a hearing is used
to distribute costs. Recent Developments, Eisen III: Fluid Recovery, Constructive Notice and
Payment of Notice Costs by Defendants In Class Action Rejected, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1641,
1654-55 (1973).
71 417 U.S. at 178.
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behind its conclusion, that as there is no support for initially dis-
tributing the costs under Rule 23, the plaintiff should bear them
since that is the "usual rule" in an adversarial proceeding."
It would seem that the Court could have used the following
reasons to support its holding. To order a defendant to bear the cost
of notice prior to his "day in court," would seem to raise constitu-
tional questions. 73
 Moreover, such a procedure ,could substantially
harm a defendant financially and possibly force him to settle merely
because he could not afford to pay this expense and then take the
risk of being found liable. 74
 Furthermore, a representative plaintiff
in suits brought on behalf of small claimants may not be able to
reimburse a defendant if the judgment is for the latter. 75 The Court,
however, did not discuss these considerations in its opinion.
The most significant consequence of the Court's holdings in
Eisen may prove to be that the Rule 23(b)(3) class action device will
cease to be an effective means by which the small claimant may seek
redress:76
 It is unlikely that the amount of damages that the small
claimant is individually seeking would ever justify the substantial
expense he would have to bear, at least initially, in order to provide
individual notice to each identifiable class member," as mandated
by the Court in Eisen. 78
 This result, however, may not be totally
undesirable due to its curative effect upon certain inequities faced by
class action defendants.
Before Eisen, the defendants in large class suits maintained by
small claimants were frequently forced to settle out of court regard-
less of the case's merits because their financial exposure exceeded
their net worth. 79
 Furthermore, the economic threat arising from the
very pendency of the action impeded any financial planning by the
72 Ed .
'' The questions would be likely to arise under the Due Process Clause. U.S. Const.
amend. V. "[Mo one shall be personally bound until he has had his day in court . . ,"
v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350, 368.69 (1873). "The due process clause requires at a
minimum that deprivation of life, liberty, or property by adjudication be preceded by .. .
opportunity for hearing appropriate to [the] nature of the case." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
74
 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1019 (2d Cir. 1973); Simon, Class
Actions—Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 388-89 (1973); Handler, supra
note 40, at 9.
75
 Cf. Simon, supra note 74 at 392.
76
 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d at 1025 (Oakes, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en bane); Ward and Elliott, supra note 39, at 564-65; Comment, supra note 54, at
574-75.
77
 Comment, supra note 54, at 574-75.
711 In Eisen the petitioner contended that the requirement of individual notice to each
identifiable member should be dispensed with because "the prohibitively high cost" of provid-
ing such notice "would end this suit as a class action . . ." The Court recognized that this
result would ensue from its holding but stated: "There is nothing in Rule 23 to suggest that the
notice requirements can be tailored to fit the pocketbooks of particular plaintiffs." 417 U.S. at
175-76.
79
 Simon, supra note 74, at 389.
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defendant, particularly if it was a corporate entity. The mere exis-
tence of the suit affected its credit status."
Secondly, the management of large Rule 23(b)(3) class actions
placed a heavy burden on the federal court system. These suits
conflicted with one of the principal goals of class actions—the
achievement of economies in court time, effort, and expense. 81 In-
stead of replacing many suits with one, Rule 23(b)(3) class actions,
when brought on behalf of small claimants, often created suits
where none would have otherwise existed, since small claimants
could not have met the cost of individual suits. At the same time,
however, Rule 23 class actions did provide for judicial review of
wrongs which might not otherwise have been redressed because of
the expense of litigation. Nonetheless, at a time when one of the
major concerns of the federal judiciary is the backlog of cases, 82
Rule 23(b)(3) class suits invariably tended to be very time consum-
ing. 83 Thus, while Eisen will have undesirable conse-
quences, the decision will rectify these inequities and inefficiencies
inherent in the Rule.
Some commentators have even questioned whether class actions
usually aided the small claimant." These commentators claim that
after the costs of attorney's fees, notice, filing of claims, and discov-
ery response are paid or subtracted from the recovery, little remains
for the small claimant. 85 If these commentators are correct, it would
appear that Eisen will not have a particularly detrimental impact
upon small claimants.
Alternative means by which the small claimant can seek re-
dress, however, do not appear to be very promising at this time. The
suggestion of using a subclass suit as a test case, discussed by Justice
Douglas, 86
 appears to be accompanied by problems which may
render it unworkable. When a subclass is organized to prosecute the
action, the original suit need not be dismissed. Thus, the full class
complaint can be preserved." The statute of limitations, therefore,
an Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View, 10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L.
Rev. 515, 522 (1969).
" American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974); Weithers, supra note
80, at 520-21; Adv. Comm. Note, supra note 38, at 102.
a 2 See Burger, Report on the Federal Judicial Branch-1973, 59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126,
1129 (1973).
" See Weithers, supra note 80, at 522-24. Chief Judge Lumbard of the Southern District
of New York felt that Eisen was so unmanageable and time consuming that he referred to the
case as a "Frankenstein monster posing as a class action." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391
F.2d at 572 (dissenting opinion).
84 Simon, supra note 74, at 378; American College of Trial Lawyers, Report and
Recommendations of the Special Comm. on Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
22-25 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Trial Lawyers Special Comm.]; Handler, supra note 40, at
9-10.
" Simon, supra note 74, at 378; Handler, supra note 40, at 9-10.
86
 417 U.S. at 179-85 (dissenting opinion).
" Id. at 183-85 (dissenting opinion).
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probably could be tolled for all class members during the subclass
trial on the basis of the Supreme Court's holding in American Pipe
& Construction Co. v. Utah." That holding was that the timely
initiation of a class action prior to the running of the statute would
protect all the members of the class. 89 In his partial dissent Justice
Douglas noted that there are unresolved issues as to what effect the
judgment in the subclass suit would have upon the original class. 9°
If the results of the subclass suit bind all class members, the subclass
suit would, in effect, be a class action on behalf of the whole class.
In that case, the Court's holding in Eisen would appear to require
that individual notice be given to all identifiable class members, not
just those in the subclass. Consequently, the representative plaintiff
in the subclass suit would face the same high cost of notice imposed
upon the plaintiff in the original class action. On the other hand, if
the results of the subclass suit bind only the subclass members,
which appears more likely, 91
 the suit is separate and distinct from
the original class action. Accordingly, it would appear that the
damages sought in the subclass suit should be based solely on the
sum of the claims of the subclass members. In this case, if the
subclass is small enough that the representative plaintiff can afford
notice, the damages sought may be too inconsequential to attract an
attorney. In certain instances, however, probono legal assistance, or
publicly or charitably funded legal assistance, may be available.
Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that all small claimants would be able
to obtain such services. Therefore, whether or not the judgment in
the subclass suit is binding on all class members, the suggestion of
using the subclass suit as a test case does not appear to provide a
satisfactory alternative means by which the small claimant may seek
redress.
If a Rule 23(b)(3) class suit is held not to be maintainable or is
foreclosed because of notice costs, it has been suggested that the
representative plaintiff could bring a Rule 23(b)(2) class action
suit, 92 which is designed primarily for injunctive relief. 93 These
suits have been extolled as procedurally simple and inexpensive as
well as suited for the implementation of social and economic
reforms." Injunctive suits, however, are only cognizable when
there is ongoing illegality. 95 Furthermore, Rule 23(b)(2) does not
83
 414 U.S. 538 (1974). For a discussion of this case, see Note, 15 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L.
Rev. 1010 (1974).
99
 414 U.S. at 552-53.
9° 417 U.S. at 181-82.
91 Id. at 182 n,3.
92
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides in pertinent part: An action may be maintained as a
class action if . . . (2) . . . final injunctive relief' is appropriate.
93
 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1019-20 (2d Cir. 1973), quoting Trial
Lawyers Special Comm., supra note 84, at 29.
94 479 F.2d at 1020.
95 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2942 at 371 (1973). An
injunction would not have helped the plaintiff class in Eisen since the alleged overpricing by
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extend to cases in which "the appropriate final relief relates exclu-
sively or predominantly to money damages." 96 Thus, the injunctive
suit by small claimants is not an entirely satisfactory substitute for
the Rule 23(b)(3) class action damage suits, particularly in cases
involving alleged antitrust, securities, and consumer violations. 97
Other judicial procedures available for handling many claims at
one time are joinder, consolidation, intervention, stare decisis, and
res judicata. 98 It would appear that none of these procedures are
suitable alternatives for small claimants, since these devices are not
practicable for handling the number of people that would have to be
involved to enable the representative plaintiff to engage a competent
attorney. The Court recognized this consideration in Eisen. 99 Ad-
ministrative agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and the Federal Trade Commission, also do not provide satis-
factory alternatives for the small claimant, since most "simply do
not have the tools available to remedy the many claims of persons
inju red. " 1 °°
Although the Supreme Court's holdings in Eisen v. Carlisle &
the defendants was stopped by the New York Stock Exchange before the suit was filed. See
417 U.S. at 160 n.2.
66 Advisory Committee's Note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
97 Class actions for damages (i.e., Rule 23(b)(3) class actions) have been used in increas-
ing frequency during the last few years by such groups as shareholders, overcharged victims
of antitrust violations, environmentalists, and consumers. McCall, Due Process and Con-
sumer Protection: Concepts and Realities in Procedure and Substance—Class Action Issues,
25 Hastings L.J. 1351, 1355-56 (1974). Since federal agencies entrusted with the enforcement
of antitrust and securities laws do not have the funds or manpower to take action on every
case of a possible violation, nor the authority to compel repayments to wronged consumers,
class actions for damages have been used extensively to prosecute alleged antitrust and
securities violations. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D, 539, 543 (W.D. Pa. 1971);
Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472,
482-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), citing Brief for S.E.C. as Amicus Curiae.
Most civil rights class actions are for injunctions, and consequently brought under Rule
23(b)(2). Brief for N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 2,
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. at 156 (1974). Therefore, since the Supreme Court's
holdings in Eisen are limited to Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, the majority of civil rights class
actions will not be affected by Eisen.
Even if a class action is brought under Rule 23(b)(3), it will not be adversely affected by
Eisen if most of the class members are not identifiable through reasonable effort, since
individual notice will not be required to be sent to these members, For example, in the typical
case of environmental injury, there is no transaction, such as there generally is in a sharehold-
ers case, between class members and the defendants. Consequently, there is no basis for
individual identification of class members. Comment, The Federal Class Action in Environ-
mental Litigation: Problems and Possibilities, 51 N.C.L. Rev. 1385, 1444 (1973). A well-
known exception to the "typical" environmental class action is Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). In Zahn the plaintiff class members were owners and lessees of
property fronting on Lake Champlain in Orwell, Vermont. Id. at 291-92. Hence, the class
members were readily identifiable.
" Weinstein, supra note 62, at 438-54.
66
 417 U.S. at 161.
lea
 Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. Ind. &
Corn. L. Rev. 501, 508 (1969); See also Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 483-85
(E.D.N.Y. 1968). For example, the SEC is not empowered to award damages. Id.
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Jacquelin may be likely to protect the defendant in Rule 23(b)(3)
class actions from being forced to settle for financial reasons, this
desirable result may well be at the cost of foreclosing the use of the
class action as a means by which the small claimant can seek
redress. If the Court had construed the notice provision in Rule
23(c)(2) as stating that the form of notice should be a discretionary
consideration rather than that individual notice to each identifiable
member is always required, the desirable result with respect to the
defendant might have been achieved in a manner that was less
damaging to the small claimant's position.
LUCY WEST BEHYMER
Constitutional Law—The Anti-Injunction Act—Due Process Con-
siderations Where IRS Actions Threaten First Amendment Liber-
ties: Bob Jones University v. Simon;' Alexander v. "Americans
United" Inc. 2—Petitioner Bob Jones University, a religious institu-
tion, sought to enjoin the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from
revoking petitioner's status as a tax-exempt organization under sec-
tion 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 3 (the Code)
because of its segregationist admissions policy. 4 Respondent in Alex-
ander v. "Americans United" Inc. 5 sought declaratory and injunc-
tive relief to restore its section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status, which the
IRS had revoked because of the organization's substantial lobbying
activities. 6 Restoration not only would shield respondent from fed-
eral taxation but also would insure that future contributors be
permitted to deduct contributions under section 170 of the Code.'
1 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
2
 416 U.S. 752 (1974). The full name of the organization is "Protestants and Other
Americans United for Separation of Church and State," Id. at 754.
3
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 501(cX3). This section of the Code exempts from federal
income taxation, inter olio, corporations and organizations "organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals . . ." Id. However, the tax
exemption is provided only where profits do not inure to private gain and "no substantial part
of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation . . ." Id.
Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 735 (1974).
5
 416 U.S. 752 (1974),
6
 Id. at 754-55. The organization's lobbying activities were evidently consonant with its
purpose, described by the Court as the defense and maintenance of "religious liberty in the
United States by the dissemination of knowledge concerning the constitutional principle of the
separation of church and State." Id. at 754. See note 25 infra.
7
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 170. Section 170 of the Code provides for the deductibility of
charitable contributions. Generally, an organization qualifying under § 501(cX3) will qualify
as a charitable organization under § 170(cX2). Loss of § 501(cX3) status, therefore, almost
automatically removes contributions which had been deductible under 170 from qualifica-
tion for deduction on contributors' federal income tax returns. Thus, "[Otte differences be-
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